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 The Adversary System and 
 Modern Class Action Practice 
 
 
 This afternoon I would like to say a few words about our modern class action practice.  I 
intend to leave ample time for questions at the end because this is Law School and we have long 
been committed to dialogue - and not lecture - as the best format for approaching complex issues. 
 
This afternoon I am absolutely delighted and deeply honored to give this lecture on the 
occasion of the first GW Law Day and with my new title as the James F. Humphreys Professor of 
Complex Litigation and Civil Procedure.  I am flattered beyond words to have my name 
associated with that of Jim Humphreys.  Jim is a personal friend of mine, but more importantly, 
he is one of the best friends this Law School has ever had.  I know quite a bit about Jim and his 
family and I greatly admire Jim as a professional and as a family man.  We both grew up in blue 
collar households and have both greatly benefitted in different ways from our association with 
this Law School which has allowed each of us professional opportunities we never dreamed of as 
young men.  As I said at a Board of Advisors dinner two years ago, Jim has devoted his entire 
professional life to championing the rights of working people seeking to find justice in their 
dealings with corporations and insurance companies.  And he has pursued this passion not only 
by representing individuals and groups of individuals in court, but by entering elective politics in 
order to help working people in West Virginia and elsewhere find  fair wages and working 
conditions, fair taxes, decent social services, and government support for those in need.  To have 
my name associated with a man like this is - for me - the greatest professional honor of my life. 
 
My topic today is modern class action practice and how Rule 23 has come to be 
interpreted in our federal courts in ways that I believe mask the proper criteria that should be 
used in deciding whether to certify a class action.  There can be little doubt that the class action 
rule is the most controversial provision in our procedure today, that in many cases it has allowed 
a remedy to large groups of plaintiffs who would otherwise have had no other practical means of 
going to court, but that - at the same time -  it has also been abused in some cases in ways which 
have proven unfair to absent class members or to the institutional defendants who must defend 
these civil juggernauts.  My goal at the end of this talk will be to suggest some fundamental ways 
we might reform class action practice to avoid the abuses, retain the benefits, and help class 
action litigation rest more comfortably within our adversary system. 
 
To do this, I will begin with an analysis of the revolution in the federal courts in the early 
20
th
 century in the relationship of procedure to our substantive law, and the fateful decision of the 
Advisory Committee in 1966 to add the modern class action rule as part of a sweeping set of 
changes to our federal joinder rules.  After assessing how Rule 23 has come to be interpreted 
during its 40 year tenure, I will argue that Rule 23 is badly in need of a complete rewrite and 
overhaul and will suggest how that might be done. 
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A major impetus for the dramatic reform of federal civil practice began with Roscoe 
Pound’s famous address to the American Bar Association in St. Paul in 1906 - just over 100 
years ago.
1
  He complained of the vices of the complex procedural rules of common law pleading 
of his day and the “sporting theory of justice” which they helped facilitate between adversary 
counsel.
2
  His proposed remedy for the widespread “popular dissatisfaction with the 
administration of justice” in our courts was to change our procedural rules to make it, as he said 
“unprofitable to raise questions of procedure for any purpose except to develop the merits of the 
case to the full.”3  To accomplish this he urged in a law review article four years later that 
procedural rules should be general in character, that trial judges be given broad discretion in the 
interpretation and administration of these rules, and that they should be applied only to allow 
parties to present their own case and meet the case against them.
4
 
 
His critique of federal practice and that of others like him had immediate results.  In 1912 
the Federal Equity Rules were amended by the Supreme Court for the first time in 70 years to 
reflect these views.
5
  These amendments abolished technical pleading requirements, allowed the 
liberal joinder of claims and parties, and permitted the pretrial disclosure of documents and, in 
some cases, depositions.  If this approach sounds familiar to our ears, it should because the 
campaign to reform federal procedure continued apace.  Finally, in 1934 Congress passed the 
Rules Enabling Act
6
 and in 1938 the Supreme Court exercised the authority given to it in that 
Act to promulgate what we now know as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   
 
                                                 
1
  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).  See generally Jay 
Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 513 (2006) (discussing the role of 
Pound’s critiques in the procedural reforms of the past century and arguing that these critiques 
are still applicable today). 
2
  Id. at 281. 
3
  Roscoe Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform. 22 Green Bag 438, 449 
(1910). 
4
  Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388, 402-03 
(1910). 
5
  See Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 627 
(1912).  
6
  48 Stat. 1064, codified and subsequently amended at 28 U.S.C. Section 2072.    See 
generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982). 
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The 1938 Rules borrowed heavily from the 1912 Equity Rules.
7
  To curb excessive pre-
trial gamesmanship by counsel the pleading rules were greatly simplified and, for the first time, 
the same set of procedural rules was to apply to all types of civil actions.  Under this trans-
substantive code of procedure, the identification and definition of contested issues was left for 
the post-pleading period and broad rights of discovery were extended to all parties.  The rules 
were written using very general concepts and plainly contemplated that the trial judge would 
enjoy broad discretion in the application of these rules to particular cases.  With few exceptions 
these interlocutory procedural rulings by trial judges would be largely shielded from appellate 
review by the final judgment rule, with the result that the power of trial judges over the 
development of cases also increased dramatically.  As the power and discretion of trial judges 
expanded under the new rules, the importance of judge-shopping to the litigants became that 
much more evident. 
 
Buried in the middle of the 1938 Rules was a curious provision - the original Rule 23 
which created three categories of class actions - true, hybrid, and spurious.  This old class action 
rule traced its history back to Federal Equity Rule 38, but was to be of little importance.  The 
meaning of this rule proved “obscure and uncertain” to the practicing bar during the next 30 
years
8
 and there were very few class actions brought in federal court under this badly drafted 
provision during this time.
9
 
 
All of this changed in 1966 when the federal joinder rules were substantially revised.  
Amendments to Rules 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, and 24 were designed to cement the notion that the 
joinder of claims and parties should be liberally allowed if they were all connected to a “common 
transaction or occurrence.”10 But the joinder change which eclipsed all the others that year was 
the complete rewrite of the class action rule.  The new class action rule was a revolutionary 
attempt to define when and in what circumstances group litigation should be allowed in the 
federal courts.  It was largely written on a clean slate since there had been so little experience 
with class actions in the federal courts between 1938 and 1966.  There was also little or no useful 
precedent to consult from other procedural systems in the state courts or abroad.  Today we have 
                                                 
7
  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 922-925 (1987). 
8
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 98, 98 (1966)    
9
  Richard L. Marcus, The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 Brooklyn L. Rev. 761, 
786 (1993); Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient 
Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. Cin. L Rev 467, 472 (1985).  But see Arthur R. Miller, Of 
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 
Harv. L. Rev. 664, 670-76 (1979) (noting the dramatic increase in class actions filed afer 1966 
and arguing that it was attributable to civil rights legislation and broad social trends). 
10
  Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 85, 86-87 (1966) 
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over 40 years of experience with group litigation in our state and federal courts and a much more 
informed basis for rethinking how the class action rule should be revised.  For the reasons I will 
turn to next, it is time we did so. 
 
After specifying various prerequisites to group litigation, Rule 23 declared that there were 
four permissible types of class actions: 
 
b1a - Incompatible Standards Class Actions; 
b1b - Limited Fund Class Actions; 
b2 - Equitable Class Actions; and 
b3 - Common Question Class Actions. 
 
To illustrate how far astray our federal courts have wandered from the key issues which should 
be considered in a class certification decision allow me to share some examples of how the 
language in Rule 23(b) has come to be construed. 
 
You may well be unfamiliar with the first two types of class actions - the b1a and b1b 
class actions.  They have rarely been brought in federal court or in state courts who have adopted 
comparable language.  These provisions borrow language from Rule 19 - the indispensable 
parties rule - and Rule 24 - the intervention rule - but have proven of little use in the vast 
majority of class action cases.  Whatever the drafters of this language sought to accomplish by 
these provisions has largely failed to come to pass.   In recent years, some creative plaintiffs’ 
counsel have sought to use these provisions to justify class action suits in medical monitoring 
cases,
11
 punitive damage claims,
12
 and certain types of settlements,
13
 but with only occasional 
success.  When classes have been certified under these provisions - as in the 1997 certification of 
a nationwide medical monitoring class for certain recipients of defective heart pacemakers
14
 - 
                                                 
11
  See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., Accufix Atrial “J” Leads Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (approving b1a and b1b class action in a medical 
monitoring case). 
12
  See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), 
mandamus denied, 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984) (certifying b1b class action for punitive damages 
only in a mass tort case).  But see In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing 
certification of a b(1)(B) class action for punative damages). 
13
  See, e.g., In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539 (11
th
 Cir. 1987) (reversing 
district court certification of a b1a and b1b settlement class action in a complex securities fraud 
case). 
14
  In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., supra note 11 at 284-85 (“The medical monitoring 
claim here is an ideal candidate for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because 
separate adjudications would impair TPLC's ability to pursue a single uniform medical 
monitoring program.”) (rev’d on other grounds sub nom Beckert v. TPLC Holdings, Inc., 221 
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trial courts have had to contort the language of the current rule to justify what they wished to do.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000)).  
 
  6 
For most practical purposes and for most practicing lawyers, the only two important kinds 
of class actions are the b2 Equitable Class Action and the b3 Common Question Class Action.    
The former has been repeatedly used successfully in civil rights litigation to permit groups to 
seek injunctions forbidding future discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age, ethnic origin, 
sexual orientation, or the like.
15
  It has also been used successfully  to vindicate various 
constitutional rights in suits to reform police practices,
16
 to obtain access to abortion services,
17
 
to desegregate public schools, 
18
 to improve prison conditions,
19
 and to change abusive policies 
in mental health institutions.
20
  The most important issue today in Equitable Class Actions relates 
not to its use in obtaining injunctions, but whether and to what extent plaintiffs may recover 
monetary remedies in addition to their requested equitable relief.  Rule 23(b)(2) was not 
originally drafted to provide a vehicle for obtaining compensatory damages and other forms of 
monetary relief, but seizing on certain language in the advisory committee notes to the rule,
21
 the 
plaintiffs bar was successful in persuading our federal courts that monetary relief should be 
                                                 
15
  See e.g. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (U.S. 1976) (holding that b2 
class members who were denied employment by a racially discriminatory employer were entitled 
to injunctive relief in the form of seniority based on the date of job application). 
16
 See e.g. In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (approving b2 
class for settlement of claims of race-biased policing where settlement terms included extensive 
reform of police practices and the gathering of detailed data on police activities, crime, and the 
relationships between the police and the communities they serve).  
17
  See e.g.,Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1978) (reversing trial court’s 
dismissal of a pregnant Medicaid recipient’s class action challenging State policy limiting the 
circumstances under which the State would pay for an abortion); Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 
2d 942, (D. Mo. 2006) (entering summary judgment for plaintiff in a b2 class action on behalf of 
pregnant prisoners seeking access to non-therapeutic abortions). 
18
  See e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 473 (U.S. 1992) (filing of class action 
seeking desegregation of a Georgia school system resulted in judicial oversight of the school 
system for over twenty years). 
19
 See e.g.,Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (U.S. 2005) (affirming the due process 
rights of a class of prisoners to contest their transfer to a super-maximum security facility). 
20
 See e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing the decertification of a 
b2 class of civilly-committed patients at mental institutions challenging the adequacy of their 
care on constitutional grounds). 
21
  Rule 23 advisory note, supra at note 8, at 102 (“The subdivision does not extend to 
cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money 
damages.”)  
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allowed so long as it is “incidental” to the requested equitable relief and not the “predominant” 
remedy the plaintiff class is seeking.
22
 
 
                                                 
22
  See, e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 1011 (1975). 
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In my view, this interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) has led our lower federal courts to ask the 
wrong questions when deciding whether to certify an Equitable Class action.  Let me give you a 
recent celebrated example.  In Dukes v. Wal-Mart two months ago a panel of the Ninth Circuit in 
a 2-1 decision upheld the certification of the largest nationwide employment class action in 
history.
23
  It alleged discrimination against women by Wal-Mart in pay and promotion.  Many 
issues were raised in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit.  The court first held the class action for 
equitable relief to be appropriate because it challenged a nationwide decision-making policy by 
Wal-Mart which left too much subjectivity in personnel decisions, because there was evidence of 
gender stereotyping in the corporate culture, and because there was statistical evidence of gender 
disparities caused by discrimination.
24
  The more controversial portion of the opinion, however, 
dealt with the question of whether the plaintiff class proceeding under Rule 23(b)(2) - the 
Equitable Class Action Provision - could also seek billions of dollars in monetary relief including 
an unspecified amount of punitive damages from Wal-Mart.  Citing language from the Advisory 
Committee Notes to the Rule from 1966, the Ninth Circuit said this depended - not on the 
amount of money the plaintiffs were seeking to recover - but on whether the plaintiffs primary 
motive in bringing this action was to obtain injunctive relief or monetary relief.
25
  Based on 
affidavits from some of the plaintiffs and the statements of plaintiffs’ counsel, the court 
concluded that the equitable relief the plaintiff class sought predominated and that the billions of 
dollars in damages the class also sought were “incidental” to the equitable claim and thus 
allowable.
26
  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit noted that it was not necessary for the trial court to 
permit class members to opt-out of the class if they wished to pursue their monetary remedies 
individually.
27
  The Ninth Circuit’s decision on this point was not aberrational - other circuits 
have also so held.
28
 
 
But whether this plaintiff class should be allowed to seek billions of dollars from Wal-
Mart for its employment practices should not turn on why the class brought the suit or which of 
the two important remedies the class sought predominates over the other.  Surely it must be 
obvious that both requested remedies were enormously important to the class - both an injunction 
against future discrimination and a billion dollar plus damage award were central - not incidental 
- to the plaintiffs case.  Indeed, for those thousands of class members who were no longer 
employed by Wal-Mart it is clear beyond dispute that the monetary award and not the injunction 
                                                 
23
  Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9
th
 Cir. 2007). 
24
  Id. at 1231. 
25
  Id. at 1234. 
26
  Id. at 1234-36. 
27
  Id. at 1236.   
28
  See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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would be the most important remedy. 
  
The more important point, however, is that the current class action rule, as it has come to 
be interpreted in such cases, has led our courts to ask the wrong questions.  Whether the plaintiff 
class, or some portion of it, regard the injunctive remedy as more or less important than the 
monetary remedy cannot logically be the reason why the class action for money is appropriate or 
not.  It also should not determine whether or not class members should be afforded the 
opportunity to opt-out or not.  But under the current language of Rule 23 that is in fact the basis 
for b2 Equitable Class Action certification decisions today . 
 
A second example of how b2 has come to be interpreted illustrates the problem in a 
different context.  Creative plaintiffs counsel have sought to use this provision to justify the use 
of large class actions to obtain medical monitoring remedies for people injured by medical 
devices, pharmaceuticals, or environmental pollution.  While the federal courts are divided on 
this question, a number have held that such certification is improper if the defendant is ordered to 
pay a certain amount of money to the plaintiff class for the medical monitoring plan because that 
would be a form of damages and b2 is proper only for equitable relief,
29
 but other federal courts - 
such as in the Rocky Flats toxic tort case in Colorado - have held that if the court issues an 
injunction establishing a medical monitoring plan and directs the defendant to pay the costs of 
the plan, then that is a proper basis for a b2 class action.
30
  Here class certification has seemingly 
come to depend on the technical issue of how the medical monitoring plan is funded and not on 
whether the class action is otherwise suitable or appropriate. 
 
Even more important and more controversial has been the interpretation given to Rule 
23b3 - the Common Question Class Action.  Here the current version of the rule asks the court to 
decide, among other things,  whether common questions “predominate” over non-common 
questions.  In a famous asbestos case in 1986 the Fifth Circuit upheld certification of a class 
action when the only common question shared by the class was the “state of the art” affirmative 
defense asserted by the defendant.
31
  All the other questions relevant to liability and damages 
were non-common questions including the products the plaintiffs were exposed to, the duration 
and nature of the exposure, the injuries attributed to the exposure and the like.  If one common 
question can trump numerous non-common questions in this way, it is difficult to know what 
meaning the word predominate has in this context. 
                                                 
29
  Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that a court 
order directing a defendant to pay the medical monitoring expenses of a plaintiff is not injunctive 
relief, but “the establishment of a court-supervised program through which class members would 
undergo periodic medical examinations in order to promote the early detection of diseases . . . is 
the paradigmatic request for injunctive relief under a medical monitoring claim.”). 
30
  Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., 151 F.R.D. 378 (D. Colo. 1993) 
31
  Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5
th
 Cir. 1986). 
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By contrast the Second Circuit applied this “predominance” test in a very different 
manner in a recent landmark securities fraud case involving 310 class actions against several of 
the nation’s largest underwriters arising out of a series of initial public offerings or IPO’s.32  
There the Second Circuit reversed the trial court and decertified the class actions largely because 
it found one issue - the “reliance” issue - would require individualized proof and thus common 
questions did not predominate even  though it appeared that the many other liability issues and 
damages could be proven by common proof.
33
  Clearly the “predomination” test for common 
question class actions is not being applied in a literal or consistent way. 
 
                                                 
32
  In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (rehearing denied, 483 F.3d 70 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
33
  Id. at 43. 
  11 
Rule 23 is not the only one of our federal rules of procedure which is replete with 
ambiguities and which has been given inconsistent interpretations by our lower federal courts, 
but it is far and away the most important example of this problem for several reasons.  Unlike 
other preliminary rulings on pleadings issues or the scope of permissible discovery, the class 
action certification ruling is often the decisive moment in modern litigation.  If certification is 
denied the claims of the plaintiff class members may not be viable on an individual basis.  Even 
if some are viable, the settlement value of the case from the plaintiffs perspective has declined 
dramatically.  On the other hand, if class action certification is granted defendants are often 
unwilling to suffer the risks of trial - even in marginal cases - and face enormous pressure to 
settle the case for very substantial amounts.
34
  There is an important irony in the fact that our 
current federal rules - which were inspired by Pound’s goal of keeping procedural decisions from 
interfering with the substantive merits of the case - should have led in the case of Rule 23 to a 
world where the procedural decision dramatically drives the substantive outcome of most class 
action cases. 
 
When so much turns on the discretionary decision of trial judges in such cases we should 
not be surprised that judge shopping has become so important to the practicing bar especially in 
class action cases.  Of course, judge shopping has always been part of our adversary system to 
some degree, but it has always been cabined by our various rules on personal jurisdiction, subject 
matter jurisdiction, and venue and by the role of juries and appellate courts in our civil cases.   In 
the last decade, however, we have seen the curious phenomenon of major nationwide class 
actions being filed in obscure venues in rural Illinois, Texas, or Mississippi for reasons - one 
surmises - that are not related to convenience or local weather.  The response of the business 
community to this phenomenon in 2005 was to lobby Congress for the so-called Class Action 
Fairness Act which gave the defense bar additional judge shopping opportunities by expanding 
the removal rules in class action cases.
35
  But in the end a satisfactory response to the issues 
which plague modern class action practice will not lie in giving plaintiffs or defendants more 
judge shopping options. 
 
So what should be done to better assure the fair and proper use of this most important 
procedural vehicle?  I would assert that three changes would be most useful - one has already 
been accomplished at least in part - but progress on the other two has not yet even begun. 
 
The first and easiest remedy is to increase appellate court oversight over the development 
of class action law.  For the first 30 years of its life the modern federal class action rule received 
insufficient appellate attention because of the rule against interlocutory appeals and the 
prevalence of settlements in certified class actions kept many controversial cases from ever 
                                                 
34
  In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7
th
 Cir.), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 867 (1995). 
35
  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, Section 5, 119 Stat. 4 11 (2005) 
 See 28 U.S.C. Section 1453. 
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reaching an appellate court.  In 1998 Rule 23 was amended to  allow appeals from orders 
granting or denying class actions to be heard, but only when the relevant appellate court agrees to 
hear such an appeal.
36
  I would go further and urge such appeals by plaintiffs or defendants be of 
right - not discretionary, but even the current rule is resulting in some increased appellate 
oversight over lower court decisions which certify or fail to certify class actions.  With increased 
appellate attention to Rule 23 the possibility of greater consistency and coherence in class action 
rulings is improved.  I urge those states which have adopted Rule 23 or some version of it, to also 
allow interlocutory appeal of certification decisions. 
 
                                                 
36
  Rule 23(f), Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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But as the examples from recent appellate cases I referenced earlier makes clear, even our 
appellate courts have found it difficult to apply the current version of Rule 23 literally or 
consistently.
37
  This leads me to my second recommendation.  It is time - indeed it is long 
overdue - for a top to bottom redrafting of the federal class action rule. 
 
Just as we abandoned the antiquated concepts of true, hybrid, and spurious class actions 
in 1966, it is time to replace the current categories of class actions - b1a, b1b, b2, and b3 - with a 
more functional definition of permissible class actions and a more pragmatic set of criteria for 
judging whether a given class action should be certified.  There are three key issues which should 
be explicitly addressed in a revised rule.  Let me discuss them in turn. 
 
Class actions should be divided into simply two categories - mandatory class actions and 
voluntary class actions.  The former would not allow class members the opportunity to opt out 
while the latter would require notice and an opt out option.  Mandatory class actions should be 
permitted when they would facilitate the purposes underlying the substantive claims in the case 
or when substantive unfairness would likely result to the plaintiff class or to the defendant if 
class members were allowed to litigate individually.  They should also be allowed when the sole 
remedy the class seeks is equitable and certification will assure that in the future all class 
members will have standing to challenge the defendant if it does not abide by the terms of the 
court’s injunction.  By contrast, mandatory class actions should not be ordered when individual 
class members have substantial individual damage claims which they may prefer to litigate on 
their own or where there are significant conflicts within the class over the nature of the proposed 
monetary remedy.  In those situations, class members should be afforded notice and an opt out 
opportunity as a matter of due process.  Voluntary class actions should be certified only when 
they are superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy and when it is not feasible to adjudicate the dispute using traditional joinder devices. 
 
                                                 
37
  See Jenkins, supra note 31 at 472 (“We similarly find no abuse in the court's 
determination that the certified questions "predominate," under Rule 23(b)(3).  In order to 
"predominate," common issues must constitute a significant part of the individual cases.”). 
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A new class action rule should also explicitly distinguish between litigation class actions 
and settlement class actions.  In the former the court needs to consider whether it is fair and 
feasible to try the substantive claims of the plaintiff class in a unitary trial.  In the latter we know 
no such trial will be needed and the issue should be whether settlement has been negotiated in a 
fair manner and whether the terms of the settlement are fair and reasonable.  Settlement class 
actions are a very important part of modern practice and today account for approximately one 
third of all class actions.
38
  At present Rule 23, read literally, would apply the same criteria to 
settlement class actions as apply to litigation class actions, as the Third Circuit held in the 
Amchem case in 1996 when it overturned a major asbestos settlement class action.
39
  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit on other grounds in that case, but held that settlement 
class actions need not require proof that they would be manageable if tried to judgment.
40
  That is 
the correct conclusion, I believe, but to reach it the Court had to ignore the literal language of 
Rule 23.  Morever, shoe horning negotiated settlements into the current categories of Rule 23 
limits the abilities of plaintiff and defense counsel alike to reach acceptable settlements in 
complex cases.  A new class action rule which explicitly defined when settlement class actions 
should be approved or not would be a significant improvement and would give counsel and trial 
courts options for resolving complex disputes without further litigation which they now lack. 
 
Third, a new class action rule should expressly distinguish between cases where the 
claims of class members are viable if pursued individually and where they are not.  The current 
rule does not adequately reference this distinction although a careful study of trial court class 
action decisions suggests it is a major factor in the decision of some trial judges who certify 
classes and a factor that is  seemingly ignored by other trial judges who deny certification.
41
  
When the claims of class members are not viable individually, the class action represents the only 
                                                 
38
  Thomas E. Willging et al, Class Actions and the Rulemaking Process: An empirical 
analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 74, 112 (1996) 
(finding, in a study of the federal courts of four districts, that 39% of class were certified for 
settlement purposes only). 
39
  Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F. 3d 610, 617-18 (1996), reversed, Amchem 
Products, Inc. V. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
40
  Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). 
41
  Compare Gasperoni v. Metabolife, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20879 *1, *25 (D. Mich. 
2000) (“Although [defendant] is technically correct that the named plaintiffs can still obtain their 
main objectives, . . . it misses the point -- which is that it is highly unlikely that the members of 
the class would ever file suit individually . . . . Thus, denying certification would seriously inhibit 
an avenue of legal redress for the members of the class . . . .”), with Eldred v. Experian Info., 
Inc., 233 F.R.D. 508, 510, 512 (D. Ill. 2005) (denying class certification in a case alleging 
consumer fraud resulting in a single payment of $79.95 or $10.95 without discussing the 
practical viability of individual actions). 
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available procedural device for affording a day in court to the plaintiffs on their substantive 
claims.  If, as Pound and others argued so long ago, the purpose of our federal rules should be to 
facilitate - not obstruct  - a decision on the merits of the case, then we ought to strive to certify 
class actions whenever that is possible in such cases. 
 
At the same time, we need to be mindful of the substantive rights of defendants.  We 
must certify such class actions in ways which allow defendants a fair chance to meet the case 
against them and, if necessary,  which limit the amounts the class can recover from the defendant 
to a reasonable sum.  Making such adjustments in the criteria which govern the substantive 
claims and defenses of the parties in these types of class actions would seem to run squarely 
afoul of the Rules Enabling Act’s prohibition on procedural rules which would “abridge, enlarge, 
or modify any substantive right.” 42 I disagree with that view for this reason.  In class actions 
involving claims that are not individually viable, the decision to deny certification to the plaintiff 
class as a practical matter denies those class members their substantive rights.  They have no 
other access to a judicial remedy.  In such a situation, any procedural ruling the court makes on 
the class action issue will affect the substantive rights of one party or the other.  The best 
approach in such cases is not to ignore the actual substantive impact of denying certification to 
the plaintiffs as the current rule and many trial courts have, but to equitably balance the 
substantive rights of the parties if possible by making whatever adjustments in proof or remedies 
are needed to yield an equitable outcome.  For too long in such situations we have let the perfect 
be the enemy of the good. 
 
                                                 
42
  28 U.S.C. Section 2072(b). 
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Let me digress for a moment to develop a related point.  In situations where our common 
law or statutory law affords a claim to plaintiffs, but where the amounts in dispute are too small 
to justify individual litigation, our law makers need to be mindful of how to define the 
substantive claim of the plaintiffs and the available remedy in such a way as to permit class 
action litigation.  Otherwise they are effectively creating a right without a viable remedy.  In the 
past, our courts have on occasion done this.  For example, prior to the 1966 class action rule 
actual reliance by the class member on the alleged material omission was required in a 10b5 
securities claim.
43
  Since then in some situations federal courts have permitted such claims to be 
brought as a class action by allowing plaintiffs to prove actual reliance through the “fraud on the 
market” theory.44  In my judgment such adjustments in our substantive law are appropriate in 
cases where the claims of plaintiffs would otherwise not be viable on an individual basis. 
 
If a revised federal class action rule were adopted which explicitly distinguished between 
the criteria applicable to mandatory class actions versus voluntary class actions, between 
litigation class actions and settlement class actions, and between class actions involving viable 
and non-viable claims, we would have moved a long way towards our shared goal of a rule which 
asks our courts to answer the right questions when ruling on a certification motion.  It would 
leave in the dustbin of history the question of whether a billion dollar monetary claim is 
incidental to an injunction claim and how one common question can predominate over many  
non-common questions or how one non-common question can  predominate over many common 
questions. 
 
Helpful as a new class action rule would be, there is more that should be done to improve 
modern class action practice for both plaintiffs and defendants.  In the short amount of time I 
have left, let me quickly summarize my third recommendation for reforming class action 
practice. Class actions fit uncomfortably within the norms and incentives which typically apply 
in our adversary system.  In ordinary litigation a plaintiff has a much larger financial stake in the 
outcome of the case than his lawyer.  That same plaintiff is also an active decision-maker on the 
key issues of whether to sue the defendant and whether to accept a settlement offer.  Both are not 
true of many class actions.
45
  The decision to proceed as a class action is typically made by the 
lawyer and settlements may be reached by class counsel over the objection of individual class 
members.
46
  The class action lawyer also has the prospect of recovering large legal fees in the 
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 See e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that 
actual reliance was required and noting that a lower court had allowed a 10b5 class action only 
because the court believed that all class members could prove reliance). 
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  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) 
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  See generally John C. Coffee Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1987) 
(discussing the lack of client control in large class action litigation). 
46
  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 
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case where individual class members can often only hope to recover a much smaller amount.  
These dynamics dramatically change and can distort the proper relationship between lawyer and 
client and the incentives which govern their behavior.
47
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  See generally Coffee, supra note 45. 
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Other anomalies also exist in class actions.  When different plaintiff’s counsel are 
competing to represent the class, the trial court is obliged to choose the lawyer for the class.  That 
same judge will later pass on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and - in many cases - on the amount 
of fees to be paid to plaintiff’s counsel.  This relationship between plaintiff’s counsel and the trial 
judge can influence the behavior of the plaintiff’s counsel toward the trial judge in ways that are 
not part of ordinary litigation where the plaintiff’s counsel is not dependent on the judge for 
future appointments or for his fee.
48
 
 
A structural problem with class action litigation is that - if there are conflicts between the 
true interests of the class and the interests of class counsel - it is often difficult for trial courts to 
gain access to the information needed to determine if this is the case.  One notorious example of 
this is so-called coupon settlements where class counsel agrees to settle on terms which bring 
little actual value to the class, but which never the less results in a substantial fee to counsel.
49
  
Another almost amusing anomaly in an adversary system is that current practice looks to defense 
counsel to raise objections to a proposed class action on the grounds that the named plaintiff is 
not an adequate representative of the class or that plaintiff class counsel is not qualified to 
represent the class.  Do we really believe that the defense counsel in this context can be trusted to 
serve as a guardian for the interests of absent plaintiff class members? 
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  See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent 
Orange Example 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337, 358 (1986) (discussing the appointment of class 
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Finding a solution to these problems is not easy within the traditions of an adversary 
system governed by norms and incentives which operate reasonably well in traditional litigation 
with individual parties represented by individual lawyers.  To address these issues and to 
preserve the usefulness of class actions we need to rethink not only revise the text of Rule 23, but 
reconsider how our judicial system manages class actions.  For all the reasons noted above, I 
think the Manual on Complex Litigation should be revised to recommend certain best practices 
in the management of most federal class actions.  In my view in such cases a second judge or a 
judicial adjunct - such as a magistrate or master - should be appointed to assist the trial judge in 
the oversight of the class action.  The original judge would make all the usual rulings that she 
does in an ordinary lawsuit.  The judicial adjunct, however, would be assigned responsibility for 
the selection of plaintiff’s counsel if there is competition for that role, would be expected to 
confer with class counsel on important decisions regarding the class action, would be entitled to 
participate in and oversee all settlement discussions in the case, and would be responsible for 
recommending an appropriate fee for class counsel in the event of a settlement or judgment.  In 
short, I contemplate that the judicial adjunct would serve as a judicial guardian ad litem for the 
class in order to protect the interests of absent class members and to be on the alert for decisions 
or tactics which are not in the interest of some or all of the class.  While the duties of this judicial 
adjunct may seem unfamiliar and may be in conflict with traditional adversary procedure, I 
believe they are justified in at least some kinds of class actions because of the conflicts of interest 
and anomalies I have cited earlier.
50
 
 
Forty years of experience with modern class actions have taught us many things.  This 
joinder device can be an enormous instrument for expanding the availability of justice in many 
kinds of civil claims.  For this reason we need to rewrite Rule 23 to facilitate the certification of 
non-viable claims.  But class actions are also capable of causing substantial injustice to 
defendants and absent class members when not used properly.  For this reason we should insist 
on opt-out rights for absent class members in all or nearly all class actions involving substantial 
monetary claims and we should expand judicial oversight over the litigation and settlement of 
class actions. 
 
In recent years Canada and Australia have begun experimenting with their own class 
action rules.
51
  They have looked to our experience in drafting their rules.  We should do the 
same and then revise our rule and expand judicial oversight over class actions in order to better 
accomplish the purposes for which this rule was intended. 
 
Thank you.  And I hope I have made enough controversial - or perhaps down right 
outrageous - assertions so that you have some questions or comments about what has been said.  I 
recognize several nationally and internationally renowned class actions lawyers in this room who 
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I am sure will have something to say about all this. 
 
 
